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Political Implications of Confucian Familism
ANTONIO L. RAPPA & SOR-HOON TAN
ABSTRACT The family could be mobilized as a political resource for economic ‘development’.
What kind of family would be compatible with a knowledge-based economy? We argue that
authoritarian Confucian familism is incompatible with the knowledge-based economy; but it is
possible to construct a different model of the ideal Confucian family which will be compatible
with such an economy: a family ideal that emphasizes internal strengths of relationships rather
than building barriers to keep out ‘undesirable influences’, that advocates a respect for
authority that is authoritative rather than authoritarian.
Introduction
The ‘family’ is politically significant in two major ways. It is important for: (1) the
operationalisation of the ideological platforms of political parties; and, (2) the mobilis-
ation of the family as a political resource for economic ‘development’. While these two
modes are often intertwined,1 and increase the complexity of the family when consider-
ing class, gender and ethnicity, scholars often treat these concepts as separate and
distinct in order to better analyse their effect on the tension between what Robert Alan
Dahl calls ‘public contestation and democratization’.2
The first of the two ways in which the family is politically significant may be seen for
example, in the norms that govern US presidential races every four years. Both
Democrat and Republican tickets usually invoke the family or family values as an
election issue. The former US Vice-President and democratic presidential nominee,
Albert Gore, stressed the importance of American working families, their role in his
platform of policies, in the period after common sense government brought sweeping
changes to the US bureaucracy.3 On the other hand, the former Republican candidate
(now President) George Bush Jr reminded American voters about family values. There
are also alternate positions in the US political milieu represented by political indepen-
dents such as the governor of Minnesota, Jessie Ventura, and the leaders of minority
parties such as the Greens and the Reform Party. The ‘family issue’ is commonly
employed as an issue in political elections in Italy, France, the UK and other advanced
industrialised countries, in addition to newly industrialising ones across Africa, the
Middle East and Asia. The second case is clearly demonstrated in the case of Singapore
where the family is perceived both ideologically and economically as a resource for
economic development and productivity.
The family has traditionally been seen as a stabilising force, especially during
transition periods of a society. By pooling resources for the common family good,
family members support one another both economically and emotionally, so that the
strength of the family as a basic social unity provides protection against uncertainties
and problems individuals face in a harsh economic environment, and reduces the social
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welfare burden on the state. The family is also an important vehicle of cultural
transmission, socialising the next generation in the values of a society. This is not
unique to Singapore. Modern scholars in China, for example, are consistent in
affirming that the family constitutes a stable factor for social, cultural and economic
well-being in modern China.4
Since 1959, successive PAP governments in Singapore have concentrated on the
importance of public housing, education, employment, health and national security.
The PAP has continued to stress an ‘economics good, politics bad’ strategy to
galvanise the population towards the achievement of material rewards through
economic development.5 This paper the second political significance of ‘the family’
as a political resource for economic development. The development of the New
Economy within the larger cosmology of globalisation is known in Singapore as the
knowledge-based economy (KBE). While a literal understanding of ‘KBE’ seems to
suggest that previous economic theories and economic systems were not based
on knowledge, the actual implication of this political slogan is that there is an even
greater emphasis in the New Economy on certain kinds of knowledge involving
transfer of technology, digitisation, financial and other information and communi-
cation technology.
While urging Singaporeans to ‘gear up’ for the KBE through training and retraining,6
the government is not unaware of the social problems that could come with it. They
emphasise at the same time the need for social solidarity, for a balanced life as well as
to ameliorate some of the problems that could be caused by the socially divisive effects
of the ‘new economy dynamism’ and globalisation. At the center of the call for social
solidarity is the importance of the family. The family has always occupied a key role in
the PAP government’s social policies, which it considers an integral part of economic
planning, from the nation’s very beginnings.7 Alternatively, ‘gearing up’ for KBE
appears to be another policy pronouncement by political leaders aimed at keeping
citizens focused on economic issues and material consumption (as part of Singapore
Inc., or what is gradually transforming into the Singapore 21 manifesto) rather than the
consumption of political goods and services. The government considers the family as
the building block of society. This raises an important question, what kind of family or
model family would be compatible with KBE?
The Singapore government’s ‘model family’ is based on a Confucian-influenced,
patriarchal ideal that includes two parents and two children, or more if the parents can
afford it. In the late 1990s, the Finance Minister of Singapore, Richard Hu, argued in
the Singapore Parliament that in Asian societies, the man is the traditional head of the
household. More recently, in an interview with the Straits Times, the first woman to
make it into the ranks of Permanent Secretaries in the Singapore Civil Service cited
‘traditional views’ of men’s and women’s roles as the reason why the civil service
continues to discriminate against female employees by denying their dependents
medical benefits given to dependents of male employees. In the ideal family, man is the
leader and woman is the follower.
Ideology and Chinese Familism
There are various approaches to fashioning the family into an instrument of directed
socioeconomic change. The ideological approach promotes a particular ideal of the
family, in form and in terms of relationship norms. In the Singapore context, this
approach could draw on a long tradition of Chinese familism. We understand familism
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to mean a family-centred worldview. By limiting ourselves to Chinese familism, we do
not deny that other ethnic groups may also have familistic outlooks and that their
traditions, familistic or not, are also relevant to Singapore. Our limited scope is
dictated solely by considerations of what is practical within the given the time and
space.
We will first consider the political realities of the Chinese family that result from
the familistic ideology. We will show that these aspects would obstruct a move toward
a KBE. This historical Chinese familism has often been attributed to the influence
of Confucianism. However, we shall argue that there are different interpretations
of the Confucian tradition, and the Chinese imperial ideology, of which familism is a
critical component, is not the Confucianism we should be reviving if we wish to
have a KBE. Instead we offer a different Confucian familism compatible with the
‘creative destruction’ in a KBE. It is a familism that caters to the need to break
through old boundaries and the need for relationships that could withstand change
and foster positive changes, even as it mitigates some of the instability that comes with
a KBE.
We shall focus on two aspects of the familistic ideology: the ideal family form and the
attitudes to authority engendered by certain relationship norms.
The Ideal Family Form in Familistic Ideology
Post-Weberian social science often classifies families into three main categories (each
with possible variations):
(1) The nuclear or conjugal family, with a couple (or widow, divorced parent) and
their unmarried child or children.
(2) The stem family, with a couple, their child or children of whom only one is
married, and the married child’s spouse and children.
(3) The joint family, with a couple, their children of whom more than one is
married, and the married children’s spouses and children.
Historically, the Chinese ideal has been the joint family, consisting of five generations
living together under one roof, sharing one common purse and one common stove,
under one family head.8 Dividing the family, especially when the aged parents were still
alive, was strongly discouraged. The Chinese imperial government awarded extended
families placards of honour to promote the ideal of five generations living harmoniously
under one roof.9 Only in the Ming dynasty was this ideal abandoned by the state, as
large families were perceived as dangerously powerful and potential challengers of
imperial power. Most scholars agree that the ideal five-generation joint family was a
rarity even in imperial China.10 In the 20th century, the trend toward nuclear and stem
families has speeded up in China as well as other Chinese societies, although there is
very recently a slight increase in joint families among affluent farmers in China.11 In
today’s PRC, ‘the ideal Chinese family supports three generations, parents, children,
and grandparents, living under one roof’.12 Michael Saso’s study of a township in
Taiwan and parts of mainland China shows that this ideal Chinese family of ‘three
generations under one roof’ is usually realized in these places.13
In Singapore, studies on the structure of the Chinese, Malay, Indian and Eurasian
families are common.14 These include scholars such as Freedman and Lee at the
end of the colonial period,15 and Aline Wong, Eddie Kuo, Teo Yeow Beng, John
Douglas McBride and organizations such as the colonial bureaucracy, state family
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planning and population-planning authorities, and civil society organizations such as
SAWL, AWARE, the Singapore Children’s Movement and the NTUC in the post-
colonial era under various successive PAP governments.16 For example, while Aline
Wong noticed a shift ‘towards a small family size ideal’, the Singapore government has
been actively promoting the ideal of ‘three generations under one-roof’17 as reflected in
various Housing and Development Board (HDB) policies that give priorities for
‘booking flats’ or additional housing subsidies for newly married couples who live
within a certain distance of their old neighborhood where their parents continue to
live.18 These confluences of state policy and cultural norm are reflected in the speeches
of Lim Boon Heng who was recently tasked by the prime minister to examine the
nature of families and fertility in Singapore’s ageing population.19
A shared ideology of the family facilitates the state’s mobilisation of the populace
towards specific social goals. However, if the state insists on a particular ideal family
form as part of its ideology, then it risks marginalising all those who do not fit the state
ideal. This is problematic because it begs the question of what happens to those who
fail to meet the ideal? Does the state mete out greater goods to those who satisfy this
ideal? For example, are children of divorced families to be considered not ideal? What
are the moral implications and can they be justified? The answers to these questions
continue to remain largely unanswered as policy-makers are often only able to deal in
specific bureaucratic categories while all other situations warrant a case-by-case effort.
Promotion of ideal family forms, when successful, usually results in a closed-off
familism that discourages civil society. W.J.F. Jenner sees this as characteristic of
Chinese society, wherein ‘because the distinction between family or quasi-family and
non-family is so strong, the ties of obligation that hold families and units together do
not extend to the outside world, unless one has run up or is owed debts of obligation
outside the closed family or unit.20 Other prominent scholars like Bertrand Russell, Sun
Yat-sen, Lin Yu-tang, have seen a similar danger in Chinese familism, though they
would not necessarily see the lack of civic-mindedness and strong civil society ties as
inevitable results of familism and would probably be more cautious about blaming the
undesirable results on Confucianism.21
We do not believe that familism must insist on a singular ideal family form, or rigid
boundaries that close families off from other social ties. Confucian familism has always
been an inseparable part of Confucian communitarianism.
Confucian Open Family Networks vs Closed Family Circles
In her study of Chinese family and society, Olga Lang pointed out that Confucius was
not especially interested in the joint family. The three family relationships among the
five Confucian key relationships – father–son, husband–wife, elder brother–younger
brother – are common to all three family types whereas those unique to joint families,
such as grandfather–grandson and uncle–nephew, were not mentioned.22 One might
suggest that this is because the latter are supposed to be modelled on one or more of
the three key relationships, but the ruler–minister and friend–friend relationships,
which are also supposed to be modelled on the father–son and elder brother–younger
brother relationships, are nevertheless specifically included in the Confucian list of key
relationships – this does seem to support Lang’s point.
Confucian familism, in contrast to the imperial state ideology, was not premised on
any ideal family form. It takes for granted whatever forms prevail in contemporary
society. It emphasises instead the strength of family relationships arising from the
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ethical behaviour of every family member. Living under one roof, sharing common
resources does not guarantee such family solidarity. Nor are all strong relationships
enclosed by the four walls of a family home. Parson’s hypothesis about the ‘isolated
nuclear family’ may seem to hold in modern Chinese societies, especially urban ones,
if we consider the walls of the family homes as cutting each group off from others, but
in fact, nuclear families are embedded in extended kinship networks.23
Besides being insignificant, defining boundaries and prescribing ideal family forms
are problematic in Confucian familism. By uncritically equating the Chinese ‘jia ’
with ‘family’, and adopting a simplistic definition of family that implies relatively rigid
boundaries, we run the risk of obscuring distinctive and interesting aspects of Chinese
social organisation. As Myron Cohen noted, even people with identical surnames who
are in no position to trace their genealogical ties (if such existed) would refer to one
another as ‘people of the same jia.’ The Chinese jia, though frequently coinciding with
what we identify as ‘family’, is much more ambiguous. It could mean an estate (of
property), or an economy (a set of economic activities), or a group that could display
a great deal of variation in residential arrangements as well as in the economic ties that
bind its members together.24
There is a tendency among the Chinese to see all boundaries as a matter of
perspective and purely temporary, if not vague or non-existent in the first place. The
blurriness of boundaries is endemic to the Chinese notion of jia from its earliest use.
Though Feng Youlan (Fung Yu-lan) might be overstating the case when he claims that
in there is no distinction between guo (usually translated as ‘the state’) and jia in
early China, the boundaries are rather blurred.25 The Analects mention in the same
breath ‘a family of a hundred chariots’, ‘a state of a thousand chariots’, and ‘a state of
ten thousand chariots’.26 The Rites of Zhou and the Later Han History use jia to refer to
territories under high officials and nobles who are below the feudal lords in rank.27 At
one extreme, the classical usage of jia includes reference to a single person of high rank,
a noble, high official or the ‘son and heaven’; at the other, it can be extended to an
unlimited number of people so that ‘all under heaven belongs to one family’ (tianxia
yijia ).28 To this day, the common expression ‘our family people’ (zijiaren
) can refer to any person one wishes to include – ‘family’ can be expanded or
contracted depending upon the circumstances.29
Those who see the Chinese family as closed circles tend to over-emphasize the
importance of biological ties. According to Lucian Pye, ‘the problem is not just that the
Chinese value the family so highly that they have had difficulty in developing loyalty to
the nation. More basic is the fact they have not associated the ultimate test of identity
with mere cultural similarity; for them like-mindedness has not been an easy substitute
for the realities of the biological family’.30 While Confucians would certainly be
suspicious as of any easy disregard for biological ties, these are not as central to Chinese
thinking as some would have us believe. Allen Chun argues persuasively that the
concept of zong-zu , central to the Chinese idea of family continuity is ‘logically
inconsistent with blood relationship’.31 Instead family continuity is maintained through
common worship by members of a shared community. Consistent with this, Confucian
ritual practice places the mourning obligations of an adopted child to his adopted
parents above those of his natural parents.
In the Analects, a student rejoiced that Confucius, in his teaching, did not show any
partiality towards his own son.32 When his favourite student, Yan Hui, died, Confucius’
grief exceeded his grief at his own son’s death.33 Another of Confucius’ students, Sima
Niu, disowned his brother because of the latter’s very bad conduct. When he lamented
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that he had no brother, his fellow student, Zixia, consoled him with these words, ‘Since
exemplary persons are respectful and impeccable in their conduct, are deferential to
others and observe ritual propriety (li ), everyone in the world is their brother; why
would exemplary persons worry over having no brothers’.34 Confucianism gives priority
not to biological ties but to relations invested with ethical significance by appropriate
social interactions. Confucian persons are not simply locked from birth into closed
family circles; construction of relations through interactive ethical practices has always
played an important role in Confucian societies.35
Families constructed and maintained by relational ethical practice are much more
fluid than families defined by biological ties. The lack of concern with prescribing rigid
boundaries is evident in the relation-based characteristic of Chinese society, family
included, in contrast to the group-based characteristic of other societies.36 As Chie
Nakane observed
The Japanese family system differs from that of the Chinese system, where
family ethics are always based on relationships between particular individuals,
such as father and son, brothers and sisters, parents and children, husband
and wife, while in Japan they are always based on the collective group, i.e.
members of a household, not on the relationships between individuals.37
A relation-based familism is much more fluid and accommodating than one pre-
occupied with defining the ideal family form. It is more compatible with a creative
mentality capable of breaking down old boundaries and transcending the status quo. It
is more likely to be an asset in a KBE.
Power Structures of Dependency and Attitudes to Authority
A relation-based familism is primarily concerned with relationship norms within what-
ever happens to be the prevailing family group. Before we consider the Confucian
ethical vision for family relations, we will examine some political aspects of the
traditional Chinese family.
To many scholars, the traditional Chinese family is based on the subordination of the
later generation to the earlier, the younger to the elder, and the female to the male.
Arguing that China’s current crisis has deep roots in its ‘history of tyrannies’, which
subjects it to ‘tyrannies of history’, so that it has great difficulties achieving true progress,
especially in terms of democratisation, W.J.F. Jenner presents the Chinese family as ‘an
authoritarian structure in which authority is determined by seniority, sex and closeness
of the patrilinear relationship’.38 It fosters respect for authority to such an extent that
individuals are trapped in submissive positions and attitudes even when those with
authority do not merit respect and deference. Though ideally authority should be
concomitant with wisdom, talent and moral excellence, very often it is secured through
a structure of power based on the dependence of a majority on a minority.
The individual Chinese person was forced into a situation of familial dependence:
economically, it is very difficult to eke out a living outside the support network of the
family; socially, friends and foes alike see a person as primarily a member of a particular
family, and a person without family is met with distrust; politically, the state and its
legal system treat individuals as members of families, both rewards and punishments
are meted out not to individuals per se but to whole families. This is the basis upon
which the patriarchal hierarchy characteristic of the traditional Chinese family was
replicated at all levels of society.
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Familial and Governmental Authoritarianism
This comprehensive power structure of dependency has led many writers to link
Chinese familism with the Chinese State’s persistent authoritarianism. The family was
the state in miniature, the state the family writ large. Max Weber calls China a
‘familistic State’. From the Han dynasty onwards, the imperial laws upheld the absolute
authority of the father in the family and reinforced other hierarchical family relations
prescribed in the state ideology.39 The authoritarian ethos is summed up in the
infamous ‘three bonds (sangang )’, which a May Fourth intellectual condemned
for turning traditional Chinese society into the ‘three tyrannies’ of the ruler, the father
and the husband.
Olga Lang suggested that other than being administratively ‘the basic unit in the
machine of the state’, the Chinese family educates its members ‘for acceptance of the
authority of the state’. She viewed the ultimate aim of the imperial state’s strengthening
of the authority in the family, as well as the primary motivation of the Confucian
emphasis on family relations, especially filial piety, to be the strengthening of state
authority.40 Jenner considers the Chinese family ‘the state’s most effective ally in
preventing the emergence of responsible, autonomous individuals and of a civil society
that could take on the totalitarian monarchy’.41
Lucian Pye’s highly influential views about Chinese political culture also emphasise
the recognised interdependence between government and the family. In traditional
Chinese society, the family reduced the strain on public institutions by taking over
various responsibilities that promote social order and public welfare. As the basic unit
of socialisation, the family system’s support is indispensable to government. Chinese
governments have always aimed to ensure that governmental and familial authorities
complement and reinforce each other, and to a large extent, that aim has been
realised.42
Pye identified the value of filial piety as one of the most striking characteristics of the
Chinese family. To him, the ‘mystique of filial piety’ surrounded both the individual’s
sense of identity and his feelings about authority; the relationship with authority was
not reciprocal and filial obligation is an absolute requirement, which exists without
regard to the quality of parental behaviour. The acceptance of unambiguous authority
is coupled with a process of strict disciplining in proper role relations, in which a child
is taught from a young age conformity to specific and rigid patterns of conduct in all
of his relationships and made to realise that these constitute a well defined hierarchy
within which he has a definite and more or less permanent place. This socialisation
process has resulted in a people who are above all conformists, who define their
relationships in terms of precise and rigid roles, who have a need and overwhelming
respect for absolute and monopolistic authority.43
Such attitudes towards authority are clearly incompatible with any KBE; indeed it is
questionable if they are compatible with any healthy society.44 While there might be a
grain of truth in some of these criticisms of traditional Chinese families and societies,
they err in presenting such social pathologies as constitutive of Confucianism, or at least
an inevitable result of Confucian familistic influence. In what remains of this paper, we
will challenge the claim that Confucian familism is inherently authoritarian by con-
sidering the reciprocal nature of ideal family relations and the nature of ideal authority
in Confucianism. We offer an interpretation of Confucian familism that is compatible
with KBEs.
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The ‘Three Bonds’
Critics of Confucian relations have often singled out the idea of the ‘three bonds
(sangang )’. Since the Han dynasty, the idea of the ‘three bonds’, often interpreted
as rendering absolute the inequality of power in the relations between rulers and
ministers, fathers and sons, husbands and wives, undoubtedly had pernicious effects on
Chinese society. However, this idea of unilateral power deviates from early Confucian
thought.45 According to Yu Ying-shih, at least one Han thinker suggested that the
Confucianism Han Wudi was so keen to adopt owed more to legalism than
early Confucianism.46
Subsequent practices that have been the targets of criticism were certainly closer to
the ideas in the Han Feizi of ‘three accordances (sanshun )’ and the ‘three
services (sanshi )’, in which inequality is permanently fixed so that relations are
hierarchical in the sense of imposing an absolute inequality of power and prestige.
‘Ministers serve rulers, sons serve fathers, wives serve husbands. When the three are in
accord, the world is in order; when these three are reversed, the world is in chaos. This
is the constant way of the world, even enlightened kings and worthy ministers will not
change it. Even when a ruler is despicable, his minister will not dare go against him.’47
Han Fei’s view differs from his Confucian teacher Xunzi, who believes that there are
occasions when rulers and ministers may ‘change positions’ without bringing chaos,
and that Ministers who remonstrate with, and disobey, their erring rulers should be
treasured.48 Xunzi views relations as reciprocal, as does Mencius. ‘If a prince treats his
subject as his hand and feet, they will treat him as their belly and heart. If he treats them
as his horses and hounds, they will treat him as a stranger. If he treats them as mud and
weeds, they will treat him as an enemy.’49 For Confucius, sociopolitical order requires
that rulers behave like rulers, ministers behave like ministers; fathers behave like fathers,
sons behave like sons.50 For all parties in any relationship there are ethical require-
ments, albeit each has a different set of requirements.
The absorption of yin-yang thought by Han Confucians tend to fix the superiority of
yang (identified with rulers, fathers, and husbands) and inferiority of yin (identified
with ministers, sons, and wives); but the emphasis is still on their complementing each
other in harmonious union.51 As Wm. Theodore de Bary argues, the ‘three bonds’ for
Han Confucians signify bonding rather than bondage – the parties in each relation
mutually support one another.52 This is unlike legalist understanding that the inferior
must always obey the superior; the superior has absolute power while the inferior has
no ethical claims against the superior. Confucians stress not control by power but the
ethical mutuality of family relationships. As Confucius’ student Zixia says, when one is
‘respectful and impeccable in one’s conduct, deferential to others and observe ritual
practice (li ), everyone in the world is one’s brother’.53
Reciprocity means that authority is not absolute, no one side in a relationship is
considered superior in all things, or to be obeyed at all times. This allows flexibility, and
enables those traditionally perceived to be authority figures to admit, without feeling
threatened, that there may be times when those usually under their authority know
better, and that the latter’s views should be respected and should take precedence over
their own. The strengths of family relationships in KBEs cannot lie in the absolute
power of any particular roles – husbands, fathers or rulers. Authority has to reside
where knowledge is. A Confucian familism compatible with KBEs would have to locate
the cohesiveness of families in the ethical interactions rather than in the control some
members exercise over others through absolute power.
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Though critics often attribute Chinese people’s submissive attitude toward authority
to the Confucian father–son relationship, there are other perspectives on authority
within Confucian discourse. We will consider Confucian ideal authority by examining
a contrast between the authoritarian and the authoritative, which will contribute to a
better understanding of the non-absolute and flexible nature of ideal authority within
the family.
Authoritative Action vs Authoritarian Action
The description of ‘authoritarian’ is often used to criticise a regime in which the limits
to authority are set differently from Western liberal democracies so that the distribution
of legitimised power, in the eyes of its liberal critics, unjustifiably favours authority
at the expense of individual liberty. Being authoritarian in this sense merely registers
that some societies are different from liberal democracies; it does not rule out the
possibility of a reasonable balance between freedom and authority within these soci-
eties. However, ‘authoritarian’ may also be used to describe a regime that ignores all
limits to authority, either in areas of its application or in the means employed to elicit
compliance. This is, in a sense, a misnomer. An authoritarian regime’s claims to
authority are invalidated by the very manner it exercises its power – authority is limited
by its very legitimacy.
There are Western as well as Eastern traditions that deny any difference between
power and authority; but for most, authority differs from power in its claim to
legitimacy. One has power over another when one is able to determine another’s action,
when another, against her wishes, actually follows one’s directives. One has authority
when one has a right to determine another’s actions, when another should follow one’s
directives. When authority works, no force is required for a directive to be obeyed.
Obedience is not necessarily motivated by fear of punishments. It need not be depen-
dent even on the threat of force.54
The authoritarian depends on coercion or threat of coercion to secure obedience of
others; the authoritative depends on respect to bring about voluntary obedience. This
distinction is implied in the Confucian distinction between a true king and a hegemon
(wangba zhi bie ), which became increasingly important in the later dynasties
as Confucians became more critical of the way imperial power was exercised. According
to Mencius, hegemony requires a large state – greater military and economic strength
– to force or threaten others into submission, while true kingship does not need coercive
strength since the true king achieves his purposes through his ethical excellence (de ).
Mencius is extremely critical of hegemons, claiming that Confucius’ students would
not deign to discuss them let alone be compared to their minions.55 Hegemony is
coercive: ‘the people do not submit willingly, they do so because they are not strong
enough. When people submit to the transforming influence of excellence, they do so
sincerely, with admiration in their hearts, like the seventy students’ submission to
Confucius.’56 Hegemons are not the worst rulers. They impose coercive rule with due
regard to ethical ends and their people often live well, at least materially. Mencius
considers them inadequate because they, unlike true kings, fail to lead the people ‘daily
toward goodness without (the latter) realizing who it is that brings this about’.57
Hegemons’ coercive power is legitimate to the extent that it creates the material
conditions for personal cultivation; its inadequacy lies in failing to foster the actual
process of personal cultivation through transformative exemplification.58
Scholars often emphasise the contrast rather than similarities between Confucius’
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and Mencius’ views on hegemony.59 Benjamin Schwartz attributes to Confucius an
‘ambiguous attitude to hegemony’.60 There is in fact no ambiguity. Confucius praises
Guan Zhong for not resorting to arms in making Duke Huan a hegemon.61 The
hegemon may elicit submission through intimidation, but coercion is justified by its
prevention of the greater violence of continued warfare, or by its provision of sufficient
security and peace for the people to continue their valued cultural practices.
According to John Knoblock, Xunzi holds a more favourable view of hegemony later
in his career, as expressed in ‘The ways of true kings and hegemons’, in contrast to his
earlier position in the chapter, ‘On Confucius’, which is considered characteristically
Confucian in condemning the way of the hegemons.62 The change in Xunzi’s position
from condemning to favouring hegemony is due to a change in his conception of
hegemony rather than a change in the kinds of political behaviour condemned.
Earlier in his career, Xunzi criticises hegemons for ‘not rooting their practice in
proper educative governing, nor developing fully the highest and most noble, nor
ordering cultural patterns, nor winning the hearts-and-minds of the people’, and
instead ‘preferring strategies and tactics’. Hegemons are ‘the kind of men who would
deceive the hearts-and-minds as a means of triumph, cloaking their belligerence in a
show of deference, relying on authoritative appearance while treading the path of selfish
gain’.63 Later, Xunzi emphasises instead that hegemons are able to reduce disorder by
gaining the trust of the people – they do not stray completely from the way of good
government.64 ‘When the rules and edicts of government have been set forth, then
although they might see opportunity for profit or danger of loss, they would not deceive
their people. When agreements had already been settled, then although they might see
opportunity for profit or danger of loss, they would not deceive their allies.’65
Though there is greater refinement in the distinctions among different ways of
governing, winning and using power, the Xunzi agrees with the Analects and the
Mencius in condemning the use of coercion unless it contributes to communal order
through the people’s personal cultivation. Xunzi’s views on authority are often misun-
derstood because scholars tend to see him through his Legalist students’ perspectives.
Xunzi’s condemnation of deception together with the use of coercion is significant
because the legalists advocate both overt coercion and the covert use of power to
deceive and manipulate as means for a ruler to retain and increase his power. For the
Legalists, staying in power is the raison d’eˆtre of governing; there is no difference
between authority and power. Scholars, like Xu Fuguan, who are anxious to defend
Confucianism from charges of authoritarian tendencies often emphasize a sharp distinc-
tion between Confucian and Legalist doctrines and attribute the authoritarian excesses
of imperial power to the latter.
Ideal Confucian authority is non-coercive. Herbert Fingarette’s discussion of auth-
ority-as-model portrayed in the Analects gives us a good starting point for understand-
ing this non-coercive ideal of the authoritative in Confucianism. He distinguishes a
consummate model from an instrumental model. The latter is copied or imitated for a
purpose that is independent of the model. The former is a fulfillment of what it is a
model of – a teacher, a human being – it ‘perfectly actualizes our ideal’ of what a
teacher, a human being should be.66 In non-perfectionist language, one may say that a
consummate model, the authoritative, shows us what it means to be a teacher, a human
being, better than anyone else, often better than we had been able to imagine. The
response called forth by the authority of a consummate model is not limited to the
imitative; its more important aspect is correlative.67
Imitation is not the most important aspect of the response to the authoritative, and
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in some cases may be usurpation.68 A model teacher may inspire her students to
become teachers – but only in the future. In the immediate relationship, what it brings
about is a change in the students’ behaviour as a student. There is some imitation
where there is overlap in their activities – e.g. how to write well or conduct an
experiment – but even then, the model must be adapted to the unique individuality of
the student. Fingarette’s illustration with music shows that a correlative response to the
authoritative involves non-coerciveness of the power that calls forth the response and
spontaneous participation on the part of all parties to the relation. ‘It is crucial to notice
that it is not merely that we need no commands, arguments or coercion – it is that none
of these could possibly elicit this kind of response.’69 Fingarette overstates the case by
excluding arguments that are not coercive from ideal authority. When a person is
persuaded by arguments, his thinking affects his feelings, and the results could be the
kind of aesthetic response and spontaneous participation elicited by an authoritative
model.
The teacher’s authority is paradigmatic in Confucianism. It is closely associated with
ideal political authority. ‘Good administration is not as efficacious as good education in
winning the people – the former gains the people’s wealth, the latter gains the people’s
hearts-and-minds.’70 Xunzi considers both rulers and teachers to be the ‘root of
order’.71 Sage-kings, Yao and Shun, ‘were the most expert in the whole world at
teaching and transforming’.72 Sages make the best kings because they are ‘teachers for
hundreds of generations’.73 In a KBE, this is a highly appropriate paradigm for
authority, given the centrality of knowledge.
What is the nature of the model teacher’s authority? Confucius’ favourite student,
Yan Hui gives us this description of Confucius as a teacher: ‘he is good at drawing me
forward a step at a time; he broadens me with culture (wen ) and disciplines my
behavior with ritual practices (li )’.74 Culture and ritual practices are not individual
possessions; they are shaped by and in turn shape the entire community. They are both
the means of exercising authority and the constraints on authority.
The language of ritual practice and culture may seem foreign to the new age of
KBEs, but Confucian personal cultivation and community building are comprehensive
ideals that are flexible in interpretation. Knowledge in KBEs will still be communal as
well as individual possessions that could be created, acquired and transmitted, just like
culture and ritual practice of the past and present. Learning is this process of creation,
acquisition and transmission. Whether the knowledge of KBEs or the ritual practice of
Zhou dynasty, what Confucianism contributes to our understanding of the function of
authority within the learning process remains relevant.
Confucius requires that a student, ‘if shown one corner, return with the other
three’.75 One corner is insufficient to determine the other three. This ‘under determi-
nation’ of authoritative direction is the key to an ideal authority that allows all parties
in a relation to co-determine action and outcome. What a student contributes to the
discourse could be something quite different and unexpected, and from which the
teacher could also learn something. According to the Duan commentary on the
Shuowen, a very early Chinese dictionary, the character for learning, xue ( ) is the
abbreviated form of xiao, the character for teaching – ‘Thus it is said that teaching and
studying reinforce each other’.76 In an ideal authority relation, both parties are trans-
formed in the process.
For the Confucian, one becomes authoritative through fulfilling better than others
the possibilities of constraining forms and through creating new possibilities; it is not an
arbitrary disregard of all constraints. The authoritative is also constrained by the
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community in terms of the latter’s response to an act of authority. Unless it brings
about spontaneous acceptance, emulation and inspiration on the parts of others to
cultivate themselves, an act fails to be authoritative. In an important sense, it is as much
the receptivity and response of other people as a person’s abilities that make her
authoritative.
The authoritative both enables and constrains. Its legitimacy rests ultimately on its
contribution to personal cultivation and community building. It is not a relation in
which one party imposes her will on the other; rather, the ideal authority relation
requires participation of both in shaping means and ends to be shared, resulting in
personal cultivation for both parties and contributing to communal harmony. The
authority may be measured in terms of how much the constraints constituted by the
action of the one in authority enable the action of the one under authority. The best
method of teaching, according to Mencius, is ‘like that of timely rain, the second is by
helping the student realize his excellence to the full, the third is by helping him develop
his talents’.77 These methods work by enabling a student to cultivate herself, it requires
the student’s full participation rather than blind compliance.
Understanding Confucian ideal authority as authoritative rather than authoritarian
facilitates individual creativity, for it is based on authority relations in which everyone
participates according to their needs and abilities instead of some controlling others.
The emphasis on mutual transformation is in tune with the need for continuous
internal revolutions in KBEs. Unlike authoritarian relations, individuals are not locked
into rigid social structures that obstruct the flexibility and creativity needed in KBEs.
At the same time, Confucian authoritative relationship promotes cohesiveness through
its ability to engender self-constraint and deference to excellence.
Conclusion
We have acknowledged that certain aspects of traditional Chinese familism are incom-
patible with KBEs. However, we have challenged the identification of this kind of
familism with Confucianism by offering an alternative interpretation of Confucian
familism. We have tried to establish that there are resources within the Confucian
tradition to construct a familism that portrays the ideal family:
(i) as being flexible in size and membership;
(ii) wherein relationships are reciprocal;
(iii) whose strengths lie not in the absolute control some members exercise over
others, but in the ethical interactions among all members;
(iv) in which ideal authority is authoritative rather than authoritarian, that is,
authority is associated with possession of ethical excellence or possession of
knowledge, and obedience depends on voluntary deference to abilities and
excellence.
Such Confucian familism will not only be compatible with KBEs; it will contribute to
their sustainability by mitigating some of the centrifugal forces of rapid changes
associated with KBE.
Antonio L. Rappa (Department of Political Sciences) & Sor-hoon Tan (Department of
Philosophy), National University of Singapore.
Political Implications of Confucian Familism 99
NOTES
[1] For example, ‘political ideology as the role of the state in the nation’s economy’, in ABERBACH,
J.D. & ROCKMAN, BERT A. (2000) In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the US Federal Executive
(Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution), p. 128.
[2] DAHL, ROBERT ALAN (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Yale University
Press), p. 6.
[3] GORE, ALBERT (1995) Common Sense Government: Works Better and Costs Less (New York,
Random House), pp. 151–188.
[4] SASO, MICHAEL (1999) Velvet Bonds: The Chinese Family (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press),
p. 2.
[5] RAPPA, ANTONIO L. (1999) Political pluralism and governance in Singapore, in: FRANK
DELMARTINO, AMARA PONGSAPICH & RUDOLF HRBEK (Eds) Regional Pluralism and Good Gover-
nance (Baden-Baden, Nomos), pp. 81–97.
[6] LIM BOON HENG (2000) ‘Trade unions: dinosaurs in the 21st century’, Speech of the Secretary
General of the NTUC and Minister without Portfolio (PMO), at NUS on 22 August 2000.
[7] KUO, EDDIE & WONG, ALINE (1979) Some observations on the study of family change in
Singapore, in: E. KUO & A. WONG (Eds) The Contemporary Family in Singapore (Singapore,
Singapore University Press), pp. 10–11, RAPPA, ANTONIO L. (1997) Encountering modernity: on
political narratives in Singapore. Working paper 14, Department of Political Science, National
University of Singapore, pp. 1–28.
[8] ZANG XIAOWEI (1999) Family, kinship, marriage and sexuality, in: R.E. GARNER (Ed.) Under-
standing Contemporary China (London, Lynne Rienner), p. 268. See also BAKER, HUGH (1968) A
Chinese Lineage Village (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press); BAKER, HUGH (1977) Extended
kinship in the traditional city, in: W.G. SKINNNER (Ed.) The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford,
CA, Stanford University Press); BAKER, HUGH (1979) The Chinese Family and Kinship (New York,
Columbia University Press); BLUNDEN, CAROLINE & ELVIN, MARK (1983) The Cultural Atlas of
China (Oxford, Phaidon Press), p. 214; FREEDMAN, MAURICE (1958) Lineage Organization in
Southeastern China (London, Athlone Press); FREEDMAN, MAURICE (1966) Chinese Lineage and
Society (London, Athlone Press); FREEDMAN, MAURICE (1968) Family and Kinship in Chinese
Society (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press); OLGA LANG (1946) Chinese Family and Society
(New Haven, CT, Yale University Press), p. 16; WATSON, JAMES (1982) Anthropological
perspectives on historical research, China Quarterly, 92, pp. 589–622; WATSON, RUBY & EBREY,
PATRICIA (Eds) (1991) Marriage and Inequality in Chinese Society (Berkeley, CA, University of
California Press); WHYTE, MARTIN & PARISH, WILLIAM (1984) Urban Life in Contemporary China
(Chicago, IL, Chicago University Press); YANG, MARTIN (1946) A Chinese Village (New York,
Columbia University Press).
[9] ZANG, op. cit., note 8.
[10] LANG, op. cit., note 8; WU, C.C. (1927) The Chinese family: organization, names and kinship
terms, American Anthropologist, 29, p. 316.
[11] COHEN, MYRON (1992) Family organization in China, in: M. COHEN (Ed.) Case Studies in the
Social Sciences (Armonk, M.E. Sharpe); COHEN, MYRON (1992) Family management and family
division in contemporary rural China, China Quarterly, 130, pp. 357–377; NEE, VICTOR &
YOUNG, FRANK (1991) Peasant entrepreneurs in China’s second economy, Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 39, pp. 293–310; POTTER, SAMITH H. & POTTER, JACK M. (1990) China’s
Peasants: the Anthropology of a Revolution (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press); WATSON,
ANDREW (1987) The family farm: land use and accumulation in agriculture, Australian Journal of
Chinese Affairs, 17, pp. 1–27; MING TSUI (1989) Changes in Chinese urban family structure,
Journal of Marriage and the Family, 551, pp. 737–747; WHYTE & PARRISH, op. cit., note 8, ch. 6;
WHYTE, MARTIN (1992) Introduction: economic reforms and Chinese family patterns, China
Quarterly, 130, pp. 317–322; ZANG XIAOWEI (1993) Household structure and marriage in urban
China: 1900–1982, Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 24(1), pp. 33–43; ZANG, op. cit., note
8, pp. 269–273. See also data from Five Cities Project and the Rural Marriage and Family
Research Project of 14 Provinces, conducted in the 1980s by the Department of Marriage and
Family, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in collaboration with 14
other institutes of sociology or research institutions under the provincial Academies of Social
Sciences, reported by DAI KEJING (1990).
[12] Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Conference Report, June 1995, quoted in SASO, op. cit, note
4, p. 1.
100 Antonio L. Rappa & Sor-hoon Tan
[13] Ibid.
[14] RAPPA, ANTONIO L. (1998) Singapore’s political governance, education, and family structure at
the end of the century, Commentary, 15, pp. 14–21.
[15] FREEDMAN, MAURICE (1957) The Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore (London, HMSO).
[16] RAPPA, ANTONIO L. (2000) Surviving the politics of late modernity: the Eurasian fringe com-
munity in Singapore, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 28(2).
[17] WONG, op. cit., note 11.
[18] RAPPA, ANTONIO L. (1999) The politics of ageing in Singapore: perspectives from state and
society, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 27(2), pp. 123–138.
[19] GOH CHOK TONG (2000) National Day Rally. See also, LIM, op. cit., note 6.
[20] JENNER, W.J.F. (1992) The Tyrannies of History: The Roots of China’s Crisis (Harmondsworth,
Middx, Penguin), p. 116.
[21] RUSSELL, BERTRAND (1922) The Problem of China (London, Allen & Unwin), p. 40; LIANG
SHU-MING (1989) Elements of Chinese Culture (Hong Kong, Joint Publishing), p. 22; LIN YUTANG
(1938) My Country and My People (New York, Halcyon House), p. 180. There has been a great
deal of discussions about Chinese civil society in recent years. We cannot go into the details of
this controversy here.
[22] LANG, op. cit., note 8, p. 15.
[23] PARSONS, TALCOTT (1943) The kinship system of the United States, American Anthropologist, 45,
pp. 22–38; PARSONS, TALCOTT (1959) The social structure of the family, in: R.N. ANSHEN (Ed.)
The Family: Its Function and Destiny (New York, Harper & Row); WONG, ALINE & KUO, EDDIE
(1979) The urban kinship network in Singapore, in: KUO & WONG, op. cit., note 7.
[24] COHEN, MYRON (1970) Developmental process in the Chinese domestic group, in: FREEDMAN,
Family and Kinship, op. cit., note 8, pp. 21–22.
[25] FENG YOULAN (Fung Yu-lan) (1939) On New Events and Issues (xinshilun) (Taipei, Commercial
Press), p. 68. Li Zehou shared this view to some extent, though he limited it the Spring and
Autumn period of China’s history: LI ZEHOU (1996) History of Thought in Ancient China (Taipei,
Sanmin), p. 14.
[26] Administrative divisions of different sizes of population have been employed by the state
bureaucracy over the next two thousand years; but the definitions of these categories change
frequently and applications also tend to be extremely flexible, even indiscriminate at times. The
fluidity of their cosmology probably counteracted any bureaucratic tendency towards rigidity at
least in the earlier dynasties.
[27] The Encyclopedia Dictionary of the Chinese Language (1990) (Tapei, Chinese Cultural University),
vol. 3, p. 491.
[28] KING, AMBROSE Y.C. (1985) The individual and group in Confucianism: a relational perspective,
in: DONAL MUNRO (Ed.) Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values (Ann
Arbor, MI, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan), p. 61.
[29] FEI XIAOTONG (1992) From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society, trans. GARY G. HAMILTON
& WANG ZHENG (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press), p. 62.
[30] PYE, LUCIAN W. (1968) The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press), p. 56
[31] CHUN, ALLEN J. (1986) Conceptions of kinship and kingship in classical Chou China, Sociology
Working Papers, Vol. 77 (Singapore, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore),
p. 8.
[32] Lunju 16.13/47/9: L.D.C. & CHEN FONG CHING (Eds) (1995) A Concordance to the Lunyu. The
ICS Ancient Chinese Text Concordance Series, Vol. 14 (Hong Kong, Commercial Press).
[33] Lunyu 11.10/27/3.
[34] Lunyu 12.5/31/6. AMES, ROGER T. & ROSEMON, HENRY, JR (1998) The Analects of Confucius: A
Philosophical Translation (New York, Ballantine), p. 154.
[35] KING, AMBROSE Y.C. & BOND, MICHAEL H. (1985) The Confucian paradigm of man: a socio-
logical view, in: W.S. TSENG & D.Y.H. WU (Eds) Chinese Culture and Mental Health (New York,
Academic Press), pp. 38–42.
[36] LIANG SHUMING (1989) Complete Works, Vol. 3 (Shandong, People’s Press), p. 94.
[37] NAKANE CHIE (1973) Japanese Society (Harmondsworth, Middx, Penguin), p. 14. On the
open-ended fluidity of Chinese family versus the relatively closed-off permanence of the Japanese
family, see also PELZEL, JOHN C. (1970) Japanese kinship: a comparison, in: FREEDMAN, Family
and Kinship, op. cit., note 8.
[38] JENNER, op. cit., note 20, ch. 6, p. 104. See also BLUNDEN & ELVIN, op. cit., note 8, p. 214;
FAIRBANK, JOHN KING (1979) The United States and China (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Political Implications of Confucian Familism 101
Press), pp. 21–24; LANG, op. cit., note 8, pp. 9–10, 24–27; WOLF, MARGERY (1970) Child
training and the Chinese family, in: FREEDMAN, Family and Kinship, op. cit., note 8, pp. 40–47.
[39] CH’U¨ T’U¨NG-SHU (1961) Law and Society in Traditional China (La Haye, Mouton, 1961); WU,
JOHN C.H. (1968) The status of the individual in the political and legal traditions of old and new
China, in: CHARLES A. MOORE (Ed.) The Status of the Individual in East and West (Honolulu,
University of Hawaii Press); JENNER op.cit., note 20, pp. 137–145.
[40] LANG, op. cit., note 8, pp. 9–10, 24–27. See also FAIRBANK, op. cit., note 38, pp. 21–24.
[41] JENNER, op. cit., note 20, p. 102.
[42] PYE, op cit., note 30, pp. 29, 87–91.
[43] Ibid., pp. 91–98.
[44] Despite the occasional qualification that some decent and even excellent Chinese individuals do
exist, writers line Jenner and Pye, who invariably contribute to the impression that Chinese society
is deeply pathological, see these individuals’ achievements as despite not because of their society.
[45] Dong Zhongshu first mentioned the idea in his Luxuriant Dews of the Spring and Autumn Annals
(chunqiu fanlu, henceforth referred to as ‘Luxuriant Dews’) only in passing without elaborating;
BAN GU, Comprehensive Discourses in the White Tiger Hall (Baihutong) provides the Confucian
understanding of this idea. Luxuriant Dews 10.1/46/23. D.C. LAU & CHEN FUNG CHING (Eds)
(1994) A Concordance to the Chun Qiu Fan Lu, The ICS Ancient Text Concordance Series, Vol. 6
(Hong Kong, Commercial Press). BAN GU (32–92 AD) in: TJOE SOM TJAN (trans.) (1952),
Comprehensive Discourses in the White Tiger Hall (Leiden, E.J. Brill), pp. 559–564. On the idea’s
deviation from early Confucianism, see in LIN LIHSUEH (1990) The relationship between ruler
and minister in the theory of ‘Three Mainstays’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 17, pp. 439–471;
CHING, JULIA (1997) Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom (New York,
Cambridge University Press), p. 267; DE BARY, WM. THEODORE (1998) Asian Values and Human
Rights: A Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press), pp. 124–125.
[46] YU YING-SHIH (1976) Anti-Intellectualism and Chinese political traditions, in: History and
Thought (Taipei, Lianjing), pp. 1–46, 43; Biography of Ji An, in: SIMA QIAN (ca. 145–86 BC)
(1964), Historical Records (Shanghai, Zhonghua), Vol. 10 (92), pp. 3105–3114. See also CREEL,
H.G. (1960) Confucius and the Chinese Way (New York, Harper & Row).
[47] HAN FEIZI (1974) Annotated Han Feizi, trans. CHEN QIYOU (Hong Kong, Commerical Press), Vol.
2, pp. 207–208). Author’s translation.
[48] Xunzi 8/27/23; 13/64/5. D.C. LAU & CHEN FONG CHING (Eds) (1996) A Concordance to the Xunzi.
The ICS Ancient Text Concordance Series (Hong Kong, Commercial Press).
[49] Mencius 8.3/41/1. D.C. LAU & CHEN FONG CHING (Eds) (1995) A Concordance to the Mengzi. The
ICS Ancient Text Concordance Series, Vol. 15 (Hong Kong, Commercial Press); D.C. LAU (trans.)
(1970) Mencius (Harmondsworth, Middx, Penguin).
[50] Analects 12.11/32/3. See also Xunzi 9/39/6.
[51] On the superiority of yang and inferiority of yin, see Luxuriant Dews 11.3/51/2; 11.4/52–23. On
their complementarity, see BAN, op. cit., note 45, p. 560.
[52] DE BARY, op. cit., note 45, p. 125.
[53] Analects 12.3/31/6. In contrast, unethical behaviour by family members may break the familial
bonds.
[54] Joseph Raz argues that authority is better understood through its ideal functioning and sees
authority as a kind of normative power that changes the reasons for action, RAZ, JOSEPH (1985)
The justification of authority, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14, pp. 2–29. See also WEBER, MAX
(1978) Economy and Society, trans. G. ROTH & C. WITTICH (Berkeley, CA, University of
California Press), pp. 946–947.
[55] Mencius 1.7/3/22; 3.1/14/11. LAU, Mencius, op. cit., note 49, pp. 54, 74.
[56] Mencius 3.3/17/17. Ibid., p. 80.
[57] Mencius 12.7/64/23; 13.13/68/19. Ibid., pp. 177, 184.
[58] The terms ‘internal’ and ‘external’ are used in the sense of ‘internal relations’ and ‘external
relations’; it does not invoke an ‘inner/outer’ psychology. for a short but clear discussion of the
debate on internal vs external relations and their implications, with an emphasis on the Hegelian
position, see the exchange between Brand Blanshard and Errol Harris in GRIER, PHILIP (Ed.)
(1989) Dialectic and Contemporary Science: Essays in Honor of Errol Harris (Lanham, University
Press of America), pp. 3–27. See also HARRIS, ERROL (1987) Formal, Transcendental and Dialectical
Thinking (Albany, State University of New York Press).
[59] TANG JUNYI (1991) Complete Works, Vol. 14 (Taipei, Student Book Co.), p. 255; ZENG CHUNHAI
(1989) Essays on Confucian Philosophy (Taipei, Wenjing), pp. 145–146.
102 Antonio L. Rappa & Sor-hoon Tan
[60] SCHWARTZ, BENJAMIN I. (1985) The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press), p. 304.
[61] Analects 14.16/38/20.
[62] KNOBLOCK, JOHN (trans.) (1990) Xunzi, Vol. 2 (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press), p. 139.
Some Chinese scholars also see such a contrast between Mencius’ and Xunzi’s view. ZENG, op.
cit., note 59, pp. 145–147.
[63] Xunzi 7/25/20. Adapted from KNOBLOCK, ibid., Vol. 2, p. 58.
[64] Xunzi 7/25/18; 11/50/7. Ibid., p. 58.
[65] Xunzi 11/50/5. Ibid., p. 151.
[66] FINGARETTE, HERBERT (1981) How the Analects portrays the ideal of efficacious authority,
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 8, pp. 29–50, 33–34.
[67] On emulation that is not mere imitation, see Analects 6.30/14/17; 15.36/44/20.
[68] I agree with Roger Ames that Fingarette goes too far in completely excluding the imitative from
the Confucian authority relation. AMES, ROGER T. (1981) A response to Fingarette on ideal
authority in the Analects, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 8, pp. 51–57, 53–54.
[69] FINGARETTE, op. cit., note 66, p. 36.
[70] Mencius 13.14/68/23. Adapted from LAU, Mencius, op. cit., note 49, p. 184.
[71] Xunzi 19/90/20. Xunzi, Vol. 3, p. 58.
[72] Xunzi 18/87/8. Xunzi, Vol. 3, p. 42.
[73] Mencius 14.15/74/18.
[74] Analects 9.11/21/1.
[75] Analects 7.8/15/7.
[76] Xu Shen (ca 55–149 AD) (1966) Shouwen jiezi, Annotated (Taipei, Yiwen), p. 128 (3B: 41a).
[77] Mencius 13.40/72/8. LAU, Mencius, op. cit., note 49, p. 191.
